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COMMENT
U.S. v. FAG. STRETCHING THE BOUNDS
OF PRIVACY
The scope of liberties protected by the constitutional right of
privacy' continues to be a source of conflict and debate.2 Attempts
I See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 487 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring). See
generally Note, On Privacy: Constitutional Protection for Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 670, 673-701 (1973) (explaining privacy right's grounding as interpreted by Court in
Griswold). The right of privacy is not enumerated in the Constitution. See JOEL B. GROSS-
MAN & RICHARD S. WELLS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING 1315 (1980).
However, the Supreme Court has found authority for the right to privacy in the word "lib-
erty" found in the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Gris-
wold, 381 U.S. at 487 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652,
666 (1925)). This clause has been interpreted by the Court to encompass many of the spe-
cific guarantees of the Bill of Rights. See LAURENCE TRIBE, AIERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
772-73 (2d ed. 1988) (listing specific guarantees Court has incorporated within Fourteenth
Amendment protection). This theory of including the rights enumerated in the Bill of
Rights within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment is known as "incorporation."
See id. Justice Douglas has stated that from these specific guarantees emanate "penum-
bras," which give them force and meaning. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483-84. These "penum-
bras" encompass those fundamental rights "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" upon
which the existence of society depends. See id. at 499-500 (Harlan, J., concurring). From
these emanations, a "zone of privacy" is created into which the government may not in-
trude. Id. at 484.
2 See Julia K. Sullens, Comment, Thus Far and No Further: The Supreme Court
Draws the Outer Boundary of the Right to Privacy, 61 TUL. L. REv. 907, 908-13 (1987).
Prior to Justice Douglas' "penumbras" in Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484, the Supreme Court
had already recognized various unenumerated rights. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (right to procreate); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35
(1925) (right to educate one's children in private school); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
400 (1923) (right to teach one's children foreign language).
Due to the noninterpretivist parentage of the right of privacy, its nature lies in an un-
defined concept rather than a delimited conception. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (describ-
ing the nature of privacy right as emanating from specific guarantees); see also RONALD
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 134-36 (1977) (distinguishing between "concept" and
"conception" in support of construing vague constitutional clauses as appeals to moral "con-
cepts"). Noninterpretivists espouse the idea that our Constitution is a living entity that
feeds off of changing political and social values while at the same time receiving fortification
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to expand the right of privacy in the area of sexual freedom have
been curtailed by judicial deference to traditional views of moral-
ity.' In particular, the Supreme Court has refused to acknowledge
as fundamental the right to engage in homosexual sodomy.4 The
Court, however, has intimated an exception for sodomy between
married persons.5 Although this exception might implicate Four-
from its historical context. See Larry A. Alexander, Painting Without Numbers: Noninter-
pretive Judicial Review, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 447, 448-50 (1983). Interpretivists, on the
other hand, argue that proper interpretation of the Constitution lies only in its explicit lan-
guage and historical context so as to give effect to the true intent of the Framers. See RAOUL
BERGER, GOVERNMENT By JuDiciARY 363-72 (1977); Michael J. Perry, The Authority of Text,
Tradition and Reason: A Theory of Constitutional "Interpretation," 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 551,
554-57 (1985).
The right to privacy is comprised of various concepts including spatial privacy, see
United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 142 (1973) ("The Constitution extends special safe-
guards to the privacy of the home."); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969) (right of
private possession of obscene materials within the home), and decisional privacy, see Carey
v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 688 (1977) (acknowledging right of decision in use of
contraception); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (recognizing right of women to decide
whether to abort pregnancy); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454 (1972) (recognizing right
of unmarried persons to decide whether to use contraception). See generally Gary L. Bost-
wick, Comment, A Taxonomy of Privacy: Repose, Sanctuary, and Intimate Decision, 64
CAL. L. REV. 1447 (1976) (listing and explaining spatial and decisional aspects of privacy
right).
The right of privacy, in the realm of intimate decision, has been held to include "'activ-
ities relating to marriage... ; procreation ... ; contraception... ; family relations... ; and
child rearing and education."' Schochet v. State, 541 A.2d 183, 192 (Md. App. 1988) (cita-
tions omitted), rev'd on other grounds, 580 A.2d 176 (Md. 1990).
1 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 498-99 (Goldberg, J., concurring) ("[I]t should be said [that
the Griswold holding] in no way interferes with a State's proper regulation of sexual promis-
cuity or misconduct."); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 553 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
("Adultery, homosexuality and the like are sexual intimacies which the state forbids
altogether.").
" See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986). In Bowers, a homosexual chal-
lenged the constitutionality of a Georgia statute that criminalized the act of sodomy. Id. at
188. The Court upheld the statute as applied to plaintiff, stating that homosexuals did not
enjoy a fundamental right to engage in sodomy. Id. at 192; see also Woodward v. United
States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1074 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (citing Bowers in holding that homosexual con-
duct is not protected by right of privacy); Doe v. City of Richmond, 403 F. Supp. 1199,
1200-02 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd without opinion, 425 U.S. 901 (1976) (pre-Bowers decision
holding homosexual sodomy not a fundamental right).
I See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 188 n.2 ("We express no opinion on the constitutionality of
[anti-sodomy statutes] as applied to other acts of sodomy."); see also id. at 218 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (precedent suggests that prohibiting sodomy between unmarried heterosexuals
or homosexuals would be unconstitutional). According to Justice Stevens, "prior cases ...
establish that a State may not prohibit sodomy within 'the sacred precincts of marital bed-
rooms.'" Id. (citing Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485); Carey, 431 U.S. at 694 n.17 (Court has not
yet defined extent to which states may constitutionally regulate private consensual adult
sexual behavior).
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teenth Amendment considerations of equal protection,6 such an in-
quiry has yet to be specifically addressed. Recently, in United
States v. Fagg,7 the United States Court of Military Review, while
acknowledging the Supreme Court's refusal to accord protected
status to homosexual sodomy, held that consenting heterosexual
adults enjoy a fundamental right to engage in sodomy.'
In Fagg, Airman Scott P. Fagg of the United States Air Force
8 See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o
State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id. (empha-
sis added) This amendment has been employed by the Court to strike down various statutes
and regulations which unjustifiedly discriminated against certain sectors of society. See, e.g.,
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (striking down "separate but equal"
treatment of African-Americans in education). Such unjustified classification usually results
from invidious discrimination against a "suspect class." Suspect classes have been held to be
those based on race, national origin, or alienage. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365, 372 (1971) (alienage); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 482 (1954) (national origin);
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 379 (1886) (race).
When confronted with such classifications, the Court must apply strict scrutiny. See
Metro Broadcasting v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547, 603 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Strict
scrutiny requires that the state's interest in the classification be compelling and that such
classification is the best and least restrictive means to effect that interest. See id. This
heightened judicial scrutiny find its roots in a famous footnote which stated that "prejudice
against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition ... which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry." United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304
U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
Strict scrutiny has also been applied to classifications which impinge on fundamental
rights of individuals. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (right to pro-
create). Classifications based on gender, however, are subject to the lesser standard of "in-
termediate scrutiny," which requires that the means chosen to effectuate an important in-
terest of the state be substantially related to that end. See e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677, 688 (1973) (striking down statute conferring "dependent" status only to spouses of
male members of armed forces); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (voiding provision of
probate code giving preference to males in appointing administrators). All other classifica-
tions need only pass minimum rational scrutiny, which requires that the classification be
rationally related to a legitimate state interest. See, e.g., F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia,
253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920) (striking down "arbitrary" state corporate tax law). See generally
Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1065 (1969) (explain-
ing levels of scrutiny in equal protection analysis); Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek,
The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341 (1949) (same).
The Ninth Circuit has come close to granting homosexuals protection as a suspect class.
See Watkins v. U.S. Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1352-53 (9th Cir. 1988), opinion withdrawn on
reh'g, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 384 (1990). But see High Tech
Gays v. Defense Ind. Sec. Clearance Off., 895 F.2d 563, 573 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that
homosexuals do not comprise a "suspect" class); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 102 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (upholding mandatory Naval discharge for homosexuals); Schowengerdt v. United
States, 944 F.2d 483, 490 (9th Cir. 1991) (same).
33 M.J. 618 (A.F.C.M.R. 1991).
8 Id. at 620.
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was accused of engaging in certain sexual acts with females9 that
were in violation of article 125 of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice. 10 At his general court-martial, Airman Fagg plead guilty to
acts of sodomy with a sixteen-year-old female." On appeal, Fagg
contended that his conviction under article 125 violated his consti-
tutional right to privacy. 2 Judge Rives, writing for the United
States Air Force Court of Military Review, agreed' 3 and pro-
nounced: "Today we recognize a constitutional zone of privacy for
heterosexual, noncommercial, private acts of oral sex between con-
senting adults.' ' 4
Judge Rives embraced an expansive reading of the right to
privacy in stating that "the right to be let alone [is] the most com-
prehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized man."' 5
Judge Rives reasoned that the right to privacy was not limited to
"matters of procreative choice."' 6 He also noted that the Supreme
Court has expressly recognized a constitutional zone of privacy
within "the sacred precincts of the marital bedroom,' 1 7 but has yet
to speak on the ability of government to prohibit heterosexual sod-
9 Id. at 619.
10 10 U.S.C. § 925. This statute, entitled "Art. 125. Sodomy," provides that:
(a) Any person subject to this chapter [armed forces personnel] who engages in
unnatural carnal copulation with another person of the same or opposite sex or
with an animal is guilty of sodomy.
(b) Any person found guilty of sodomy shall be punished as a court-martial may
direct.
Id.
The phrase "unnatural carnal copulation" has withstood constitutional attacks for
vagueness, see United States v. Scoby, 5 M.J. 160 (C.M.A. 1978), and has been interpreted
to include the acts of fellatio, id., and cunnilingus, see United States v. Harris, 8 M.J. 52
(C.M.A. 1979).
,' Fagg, 33 M.J. at 619. More specifically, Fagg admitted to numerous acts of both cun-
nilingus and fellatio with the sixteen-year-old. Id. The court decided to treat the sixteen-
year-old as an adult for purposes of this section of the Code. Id. Airman Fagg was eighteen
years of age at the time of the occurrences. Id. Fagg's trial by military judge resulted in,
inter alia, a bad conduct discharge and seven months confinement. Id.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 621.
14 Id. at 619.
" Id. (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)).
16 Fagg, 33 M.J. at 620 (allowing possession of constitutionally unprotected obscene
material in privacy of one's home) (citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969)).
Judge Rives also noted that "'the outer limits' of the right to privacy 'have not been
marked.'" Id. (quoting Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977)).
17 Fagg, 33 M.J. at 620 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 188 n.2 (1986)).
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omy.18 The Fagg court then held that the consensual sexual activi-
ties of unmarried heterosexuals fall within the ambit of this "zone
of privacy" into which the government may not intrude.,, In ex-
tending these privacy protections to unmarried heterosexuals, the
court relied on Eisenstadt v. Baird20 in which the Supreme Court
invalidated a statute limiting access to contraceptives to unmarried
persons because such a restriction violates the Equal Protection
Clause.21 Finally, Judge Rives noted that only a compelling govern-
mental interest will justify the infringement of this fundamental
right.22 Since the government recognizes no interest in the private
moral conduct of its servicemen,23 the court reasoned that Airman
Fagg's exercise of his right to privacy in this instance could not be
constitutionally proscribed.24
Judge James dissented, arguing that this attempted extension
of the right to privacy was wholly lacking in constitutional author-
ity.25 He pointed to the decision in Schochet v. State26 in which
the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland was faced with the iden-
tical issue.27 The Schochet court reasoned that the right to privacy
is grounded in conventional notions of marriage, the home, and the
family.28 Based on this narrow interpretation, the Schochet court
18 Fagg, 33 M.J. at 620 (citing Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190, 196).
19 Fagg, 33 M.J. at 620.
20 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
1 Id. at 440-41, 446-47.
22 Fagg, 33 M.J. at 620.
23 Id. (citing United States v. Snyder, 4 C.M.R. 15, 19 (1952)). Judge Rives did recog-
nize, however, that a serviceman's "right to engage in certain sexual activities ... is not
without limits." Id. He specifically noted that aggravating circumstances, such as violating a
supervisor-subordinate duty relationship, justifies prosecution when the underlying act is
fornication. Id. (citing United States v. Parrillo, 31 M.J. 886 (A.F.C.M.R. 1990), aff'd, 34
M.J. 112 (C.M.A. Mar. 6, 1992)).
24 Id. at 621.
21 Id. (James, J., dissenting).
28 541 A.2d 183 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.), rev'd, 580 A.2d 176 (Md. 1988).
11 Fagg, 33 M.J. at 622 (James, J., dissenting). Judge James stated that although
Schochet was overruled by the state supreme court, the analysis of the intermediate court
was reliably sound. Id. at 622 n.2 (James, J., dissenting).
18 Schochet, 541 A.2d at 189 (citing Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65
(1973)). The importance of the home, marriage, and family life in the underpinnings of the
right to privacy was most eloquently stated by Justice Harlan:
Certainly the safeguarding of the home does not follow merely from the sanctity
of property rights. The home derives its pre-eminence as the seat of family life.
And the integrity of that life is something so fundamental that it has been found
to draw to its protection the principles of more than one explicitly granted Consti-
tutional right. ...
Of this whole 'private realm of family life' it is difficult to imagine what is
1993] U.S. v. FAGG 1197
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held that there exists no fundamental right to noncommercial, het-
erosexual sodomy between consenting, unmarried adults because
they lack the necessary marital union that inheres in the tradi-
tional conception of the right of privacy as formulated by the Su-
preme Court. 9
The Fagg decision brings to light the tension created by the
Supreme Court's moralistic grounding of the right to privacy found
in Griswold v. Connecticut."° In Griswold, the Supreme Court
viewed traditional values and considerations attendant to the insti-
tution of marriage as the touchstones for application of the right to
privacy.31 Subsequent decisions of the Court, however, seem to in-
dicate that a more expansive principle of personal autonomy is the
more appropriate focus in determining the parameters of
"privacy. ' '9 2
The Fagg holding would lie perfectly consistent with the Su-
preme Court's previous application of the right to privacy, except-
ing the Court's landmark decision in Bowers v. Hardwick. In
Bowers, the Supreme Court refused to recognize a fundamental
right of consenting adults to engage in homosexual sodomy.3 4
more private or more intimate than a husband and wife's marital relations.
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551-52 (1960) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
11 See Schochet, 541 A.2d at 186-95. Judge Moylan commenced his analysis by noting
that Griswold and Ullman had grounded the right to privacy in the "institution of mar-
riage." Id. at 187. Next, the court argued that Eisenstadt, primarily an equal protection
case, could not be used to broaden the scope of the right to privacy beyond its grounding in
traditional notions of marriage. Id. at 191-92. Rather, the court characterized the interests
protected by the right of privacy as "only personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental'
or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' "Id. at 192 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
152 (1973)). Given this, Judge Moylan reasoned that autonomy in sexual behavior was not
fundamental. Id. Finally, the court called upon Doe v. City of Richmond, 403 F. Supp. 1199
(1975), aff'd without opinion, 425 U.S. 901 (1976), and Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986), as support for their finding that homosexual and pre-marital sex played no part in
marriage, family or the home, leaving such practices beyond the realm of constitutional pro-
tection, id. at 192-95.
30 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
31 Id., at 495.
3' See, e.g., Carey, 431 U.S. at 687 ("[S]ubsequent decisions have made clear that the
constitutional protection of individual autonomy in matters of childbearing is not depen-
dent on [marital status]."); Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 ("privacy means.., the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion"); see
also Jane Aline Eichbaum, Towards an Autonomy-Based Theory of Constitutional Privacy:
Beyond the Ideology of Familial Privacy, 14 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 361, 365-67 (1979)
(discussing the distinctions between autonomy based right to privacy and right based on
majoritarian sentiment).
3s 478 U.S. 176 (1986)
3' See Bowers. 478 U.S. at 192.
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When Fourteenth Amendment considerations of Equal Protection
are taken into account, the Fagg decision, arguably, calls into ques-
tion the validity of Bowers by recognizing a right of heterosexual
sodomy. 5 It is not at all clear that the Supreme Court would be
willing to raise the same question.
This Comment will present a Constitutional analysis based on
a hypothetical situation that presumes that the Supreme Court has
just granted certiorari to U.S. v. Fagg and is about to render its
decision based on existing precedent. Part One will discuss the two
competing bases upon which the right to privacy has been
grounded: first, the right to privacy as a function of marital status;
and second, the much broader right of privacy based on the princi-
ple of personal autonomy. The conduct of Airman Fagg will then
be evaluated in terms of each of these concepts. Part Two points
out possible equal protection problems that would result from the
Supreme Court's adoption of the Fagg decision. Various moral con-
siderations will be noted and used to conclude that perhaps the
Fagg court reached a decision compatible with the intent of the
Framers, but lacked the authority to effectuate this intent consid-
ering the previous constitutional interpretations by the Supreme
Court in similar issues.
I. THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY: SCOPE AND APPLICATION
A. Marital Status
As first recognized by the Supreme Court in Griswold v. Con-
necticut,36 the right to privacy was founded on respect for the
privacies inherent in marriage.3 This foundation echoed the con-
cerns of Justice Harlan, dissenting in Poe v. Ullman,3 e which called
35 See Fagg, 33 M.J. at 620. The court first looked to Bowers to note that the Supreme
Court had left open the issue of the status of acts of sodomy between heterosexuals. Id.
Seeing that the Supreme Court intimates an almost absolute immunity to "the sacred pre-
cincts of marital bedrooms," the court concluded that sodomy between married couples
could not be prohibited. Id. (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965)).
Applying Eisenstadt, the court then concluded that a fundamental right to sodomy would
exist between unmarried heterosexuals. Id. By narrowing the class of unmarried persons to
heterosexuals, the court seems to have effectively eluded direct conflict with the Bowers
decision. It is submitted, however, that the court failed to then continue its equal protection
analysis as applied to homosexuals, leaving the analysis incomplete.
38 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
17 See id. at 485-86.
38 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
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for an expansive interpretation of "liberty" in the Fourteenth
Amendment to extend protection to unenumerated, non-eco-
nomic,39 fundamental rights.40 The Griswold Court adopted this
expansive approach in holding that a Connecticut statute41 that
criminalized the use of contraceptives by married couples was an
unconsitutional interference with a fundamental right of privacy
under the Fourteenth Amendment.42 The Court stressed its aver-
sion to possible unwarranted searches and seizures of the "marital
precincts" that would inevitably result from the enforcement of
such a statute.43
The judicial deference given to sexual decisions made within
the marital relationship are inapplicable to Airman Fagg due to
the simple fact that he committed an act of sodomy with someone
other than his wife. 44 Thus, recognition of a right to privacy based
39 Cf. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) ("fundamental" economic rights
were once read into the word "liberty" of Fourteenth Amendment). In Lochner, the Court
struck down a New York statute limiting the amount of hours bakery workers could work
each day and each week. Id. at 45 n.1, 57. The Court accomplished this by holding that such
a statute interfered with employers' and employees' fundamental right to contract protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 57.
This type of use of the Fourteenth Amendment is known as "substantive due process."
See Brett J. Williamson, Note, The Constitutional Privacy Doctrine After Bowers v. Hard-
wick: Rethinking the Second Death of Substantive Due Process, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1297,
1297 n.2 (1989). Substantive due process refers to the method by which an activist Court
creates substantive rights from the Due Process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments, which on their face refer only to procedural fairness. See id. More specifically, in the
area of economic rights, this method of judicial activism became disparagingly known as
"Lochnerizing." See TRIBE, supra note 1, at 567. By the 1930's, this concept had breached
the limits of both social and political tolerance due to its use by the Court in striking down
every attempt by President Roosevelt to enact ameliorative economic legislation. See id. at
578-81. After threats of court-packing, see id. at 580, this view of "liberty" was finally extin-
guished in 1937 with the Court's about-face decision in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300
U.S. 379, 398-99 (1937) (upholding minimum wage legislation identical to that struck down
one year earlier). This method of substantive due process, however, lives on, but is em-
ployed to protect non-economic rather than merely economic rights of the individual. See
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
40 See Ullman, 367 U.S. at 543 (Harlan, J., dissenting); supra note 1.
41 See CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 53-32 (1958) (repealed 1969). The Connecticut statute
provided:
Use of drugs or instruments to prevent conception. Any person who uses any
drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception
shall be fined not less than fifty dollars or imprisoned not less than sixty days nor
more than one year or be both fined and imprisoned.
Id.
42 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86.
4' See id.
4 See Fagg, 33 M.J. at 619.
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solely on marital status necessarily precludes the recognition of a
fundamental right to engage in non-marital sodomy.45 A right to
non-marital sodomy, therefore, must derive elsewhere.
B. Personal Autonomy
Although the Griswold Court premised the right of privacy on
marriage and the home,4 subsequent decisions such as Eisenstadt
v. Baird,47 Roe v. Wade, 4  and Planned Parenthood v. Danforth49
resonate with autonomic rather than marital concerns, recognizing
privacy rights in the individual regardless of marital status.50
The principle of personal autonomy dictates that the individ-
ual enjoy broad discretion in making decisions that are inherently
personal.5 1 This would seem to encompass virtually complete sex-
ual freedom, provided the acts in question were conducted in pri-
vate quarters between consenting adults.52 Such conduct is deemed
to have no measurable effect on society53 and should therefore lie
beyond the scope of government regulation. The Fagg decision
adopted this approach and held that Airman Fagg's conduct was
constitutionally protected.
5 4
Conversely, the Bowers decision55 strongly evidences the Su-
preme Court's reluctance to use an autonomy-based rationale to
expand the right of privacy to adult consensual homosexual sod-
omy.56 Equally as troubling is a footnote in the Carey v. Popula-
45 See Schochet v. State, 541 A.2d 183, 194 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988).
" See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86 (emphasizing importance of marriage in striking
down statute criminalizing use of contraceptives by married persons).
47 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
48 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
49 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
50 See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 (extending right of privacy's foundation from mar-
riage to fundamental concerns of individuals by extending right recognized in Griswold to
unmarried persons); Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53 (recognizing unmarried woman's fundamental
right to terminate pregnancy); Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74 (striking down statute requiring
parental consent for abortion performed on unmarried minor).
"I See Joel Feinberg, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Privacy, 58 NORE DAME L. REV.
445, 457-58 (1983).
'2 See id. at 454.
83 See JOEL FEINBERG, RIGHTS, JUSTICE, AND THE BOUNDS OF LmERTY 75 (1980).
See Fagg, 33 M.J. at 621.
88 See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text (discussion of Bowers).
See Eichbaum, supra note 32, at 379-81; see also Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413
U.S. 49, 65 (1973) (limiting right of privacy to "personal intimacies of the home, the family,
marriage, motherhood, procreation, and child rearing") (citations omitted); United States v.
Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 143-44 (1973) (upholding law prohibiting transport of pornographic
12011993]
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tion Services57 decision that seems to indicate that the Court is
unwilling to grant sexual autonomy to minors.58  Nevertheless,
many commentators view the autonomy-based model of the right
to privacy as the only viable constitutional framework from which
the right may be expanded.59 The crux of their argument lies in a
recognition of "the moral fact that a person belongs to himself and
not to others nor to society as a whole."60 They view the "core
materials for transporter's own use).
11 See Carey, 431 U.S. at 694 n.17.
:8 Id.
9 See Eichbaum, supra note 32, at 365-67; Feinberg, supra note 51, at 446; Louis Hen-
kin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1425 (1974).
60 See Charles Fried, Correspondence, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 288, 288 (1977). The propri-
ety of the legislation of morality has been hotly debated within academic circles. See Rolf E.
Sartorius, The Enforcement of Morality, 81 YALE L.J. 891, 900-910 (1972) (arguing in favor
of utilitarian viewpoint); see also Robert H. Bork, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLrrI-
CAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW, 111-126 (Touchstone Books 1990) (arguing that much legisla-
tion is based purely on moral grounds).
John Stuart Mill's essay On Liberty, first published in 1859, resurfaced among scholarly
debate in 1957 with the release of a report by the British Wolfenden Committee on Homo-
sexual Offenses and Prostitution. See Yao Apasu-Cbotsu, et al., Note, Survey on the Consti-
tutional Right to Privacy in the Context of Homosexual Activity, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 521,
613 (1986) [hereinafter Survey]. This report adopted the Millian view that private morality
lies beyond the control of the government. See id. John Stuart Mill specifically stated:
[Tjhe only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member
of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own
good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be
compelled to do or forebear because it will be better for him to do so, because it
will make him happier, because, in the opinion of others, to do so would be wise,
or even right.
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 9 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Publishing Co. 1978)
(1859) (emphasis added).
This constitutes the paradigm argument against what is known as moral paternalism,
which imposes the public morality upon the private individual for the reason that it is for
that individual's "own good." See Ronald Dworkin, Liberal Community, 77 CAL L. REV. 479,
484-87 (1989). Paternalism is a weak force in the area of criminal law, and for that reason
scholars have proferred the "disintegration thesis" as an alternative basis for the legislation
of morality, which argues that morality acts like a kind of "social adhesive" without which
society would fall into to decay. See H.L.A. Hart, Social Solidarity and the Enforcement of
Morality, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2-4 (1967). The disintegration thesis espouses the idea that
the sharing of common moral values is an absolute necessity for a stable and functional
community. See id. The thesis applies the Millian harm principle to what it sees as the
building blocks of society. The harm imagined here is of a more intangible and elusive sort,
in that it is supposed to damage the impalpable common belief of a polity that their ways
are correct. See id. It is argued that insecurity in this belief will lead to insecurity in social
action, which in turn will lead to instability in social relations, resulting in a slow disintegra-
tion of the social infrastructure. See id. Besides the problems of proving such remote causa-
tion, this argument fails due to its a priori assumption that morality is a determinative
factor in social stability. See H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY 50 (1963). More-
over, even if it is assumed that morality constitutes such a factor, how do we measure the
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function of constitutional guarantees [as vindicating] minority
rights."'" Accepting this approach, legislation which impinges on
the conduct of fringe elements of society and is enacted solely in
furtherance of majoritarian moral concerns would be invalid. 2
II. UNEQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS
Given the Supreme Court's refusal to extend the right of pri-
vacy to encompass acts of homosexual sodomy, 3 issues of equal
protection arise if such conduct is viewed as a fundamental right in
heterosexuals. In Bowers, the Supreme Court expressly declined to
resolve the issue of heterosexual sodomy and intentionally "left the
door open" for later resolution.6 4 The Court, however, did make
clear that protection does not extend to homosexual sodomy be-
cause of society's long-standing statutory prohibitions against it.6s
The Court stated further that such activity was not "deeply rooted
in [our] Nation's history," and any argument to the contrary was,
at best, "facetious.""6
The Bowers Court's deference to traditional values and public
sentiment in upholding a statute prohibiting homosexual sodomy
makes it difficult to speculate as to how the Court would respond
to a challenge to a similar statute brought by a heterosexual
couple. It is submitted that any distinction made based on sexual
amount of immorality the social structure can withstand? See Ronald Dworkin, Lord Devlin
and the Enforcement of Morals, 75 YALE L.J. 986, 991 (1966).
It is proposed that this lack of empirical evidence of the harm suffered by society
through the moral transgressions of the individual should compel government to err on the
side of personal liberty in framing its penal codes. More specifically, in regard to the Su-
preme Court's use of the institution of marriage as the touchstone for the right of privacy,
an argument by Joel Feinberg seems to provide substantial criticism:
The socially useful institutions of marriage and the family can be weakened, and
the chaste life made more difficult. [The supposed harmful consequences of
which] are highly speculative, and there is no hard evidence that the penal laws
would prevent [such consequences] in any case.
FEINBERG, supra note 53, at 75.
61 Eichbaum, supra note 32, at 366. A family-based right of privacy fits "harmoniously"
and necessarily within the majoritarian political process, and therefore is useless, "in curring
'prejudice against discrete and insular minorities.'" Id. (citation omitted).
62 See id. at 366-67; H.L. Wilkinson I & G. Edward White, Constitutional Protection
for Personal Lifestyles, 62 CoRNBuL L. REv. 563, 613 (1977).
"' See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
" See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 188 n.2; see also Carey, 431 U.S. at 694 n.17 (noting that the
Supreme Court has not yet decided the extent of valid state regulation of adult, consensual,
sexual relations).
65 See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191-94.
Id. at 194.
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preference would not withstand scrutiny under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. 7 Thus, if the Supreme Court were to recognize a fun-
damental right of heterosexual sodomy, as the Fagg court did, it
would by implication undermine the validity of the Bowers
decision.
The Supreme Court has stated that legislation limiting funda-
mental rights may be justified only by showing both that a compel-
ling governmental interest exists in regulating the particular con-
duct and that the statute is narrowly tailored to be the least
restrictive means of effectuating that interest.8 This standard of
judicial review is known as "strict scrutiny.""9 If, as in Fagg, the
Court decides that a statute prohibiting sodomy violates a hetero-
sexual's constitutional right of privacy on the grounds that heter-
osexuals have a fundamental right to engage in sodomy, strict scru-
tiny must be applied in denying this right to homosexuals.70
The legislative history behind the criminalization of sodomy in
the Uniform Code of Military Justice is based on common law, 1
which prohibited sodomy on the grounds of health and moral con-
cerns. 72 In light of today's health concerns about the rise in sexu-
ally transmitted diseases, it seems clear that there may be a com-
pelling governmental interest in proscribing sodomy outside the
precincts of marriage. Once this right is extended to unmarried
adults, however, this human health justification for the prohibition
becomes less tenable as pertaining to homosexual sodomy. 3 This
leaves the state in a position of justifying a statute proscribing ho-
67 See supra note 6 (language of Equal Protection Clause).
11 Roe, 410 U.S. at 155; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485; see also TRIE, supra note 1, § 16-6
(discussion of strict scrutiny as applied to equal protection); supra note 6 and accompanying
text (discussion of case law interpretations of Equal Protection Clause).
69 See Attorney General of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 904 (1986); Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985); Pyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 &
n.15 (1982); see also supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussion of strict scrutiny ap-
plied in context of equal protection claims).
70 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. Some courts have struck down such stat-
utes even before considering the nature of the right being infringed. See Commonwealth v.
Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47, 49 n.1, 50-52 (Pa. 1980) (holding such legislation to be invalid exercise
of state police power).
"' See S. REP. No. 486, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1949), reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2222, 2258.
7 See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192. A number of states have prohibited sodomy since as far
back as the eighteenth century. Id. at 192-93 nn.5-6.
11 See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 451 (if statute "were a health measure, it would not only
discriminate against the unmarried, but also be overbroad with respect to the married");
infra note 74.
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mosexual sodomy solely on moral grounds. 4 Although legislation
based solely on moral grounds has endured minimum rational
scrutiny7 5 it seems that such an interest would not fare as well
under the strictest judicial scrutiny.76
If the Supreme Court were to affirm a decision such as Fagg
and create a fundamental right in unmarried couples to engage in
heterosexual sodomy, it could not, consistent with Equal Protec-
tion, continue to deny this right to homosexuals. Given the current
conservatism of the Court and its affinity for federalism, 7 7 however,
it is unlikely that the Court will be willing to venture into such
extensions of the right of privacy and take this first step toward a
fundamental right to homosexual sodomy.
Should the Court deny to all a fundamental right to sodomy,
justification for sodomy statutes becomes a more simple matter.
Absent any implication of fundamental rights or invidious discrim-
ination based on race, alienage, or gender, the states may create
classifications that need only be supported by a legitimate state
interest.78 Since courts have considered morality as serving a legiti-
7' See Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1884). Every state has the police power to
promulgate "regulations [that] promote the health, peace, morals, education, or good order
of the people." Id. (emphasis added). Generally, there are two interests that states assert in
criminalizing the act of sodomy moral concerns and health concerns. See Survey, supra
note 60, at 639-57 (appendix cataloguing state legislative histories of sodomy statutes).
While valid health concerns, such as stemming the spread of disease, are a legitimate state
interest, regulations are valid only if the statute is applicable to all persons. See id. at 623-
25. Thus, once a statute is made applicable only to certain classes of citizens, the only re-
maining state interest that would validate the statute would be the maintenance of morality.
See id. at 612-22; see also Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 (recognizing propriety of legislation based
on moral grounds).
71 See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 446-47, 452. Minimum rational scrutiny requires that the
state regulation be reasonably related to a legitimate interest. See F.S. Royster Guano Co. v.
Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920); TRIBE, supra note 1, § 16-2.
7' See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 913 n.10 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing); G. SmaNy BUCHANAN, MoRALrry, SEX, AND THE CONSTITUTION 33-41 (1985). Indeed, in
the area of anti-sodomy legislation, some courts have held that moral concerns behind
prohibiting unmarried sodomy will not even pass minimum rational scrutiny. See People v.
Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981). The Bowers Court
disagreed with the notion that "majority sentiments about the morality of homosexuality
should be declared inadequate." See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 ("The law, however, is con-
stantly based on notions of morality, and if all laws representing essentially moral choices
are to be invalidated the courts will be very busy indeed.").
7 See,. e.g., Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 (suggesting that minority Indigenous Americans
petition their state legislature if they wish to change generally applicable law regarding the
use of Peyote for religious purposes).
78 See, e.g., Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 487 U.S. 450, 456-62 (1988); Pennell
v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 14 (1988); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297. 303 (1976).
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mate state interest,79 the states would then be free to legislate the
popular morality in full accordance with the Constitution. This
leaves a dissident's only recourse in legislative action, 80 which inva-
riably equates to no remedy at all."'
CONCLUSION
The right of privacy must be applied consistently if it is to
enjoy any validity. The Supreme Court, in relying on society's deep
respect for the marital union, has fashioned an unnecessarily nar-
row foundation upon which the right of privacy may operate. The
United States Air Force Court of Military Review, in its decision in
United States v. Fagg, realized the error in this truncated view of
privacy and sought to give full life to the autonomic concerns in-
herent in a broader concept of privacy. Unfortunately, these lauda-
ble intentions amount to naught when equal protection analysis is
applied to its decision in light of the Supreme Court's decision in
Bowers v. Hardwick. Put simply, if the Constitution were to recog-
nize a fundamental right in married persons and unmarried heter-
osexuals to engage in sodomy, as the Fagg court would have it,
there must be a compelling interest in denying this right to homo-
sexuals, per the Bowers decision. This compelling interest does not
exist. When the Supreme Court is faced with a case that questions
the right to engage in non-marital heterosexual sodomy, and then
realizes the importance of freedom of intimate expression, as well
as the importance of a general right of personal autonomy, it will
necessarily have to reconsider decisions denying the same rights to
" See Ullman, 367 U.S. at 546 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan felt that "laws
forbidding adultery, fornication and homosexual practices . . . form a pattern so deeply
pressed into the substance of our social life that any Constitutional doctrine [in the area of
privacy] must build upon that basis." Id.; see also Carter v. State, 500 S.W.2d 368, 372 (Ark.
1973) (declaring sodomy proscription as legitimate exercise of state police power), cert. de-
nied, 416 U.S. 905 (1974).
"I See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890; Doe v. Richmond, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1202 (E.D. Va.
1975), af'd without opinion, 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
61 See Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARv. L. REv. 713, 732-33
(1985) (arguing that homosexuals are unable to effectively participate in political process
due to lack of ability in others to accept them); Denise Dunnigan, Note, Constitutional Law:
A New Suspect Class: A Final Reprieve for Homosexuals in the Military?, 42 OKLA. L. Rv.
273, 285 (1989) (noting the "impossible position in which homosexuals find themselves when
trying to participate in the political process").
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homosexuals. Until then, decisions such as Fagg will remain consti-
tutional "glimmers of hope."
Peter W. Overs Jr.

